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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This dispute between Respondent Boise Mode LLC ("Boise Mode") and Appellants

Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd. ("Donahoe Pace") and Timothy Pace (Appellants are, where
appropriate, collectively referred to "DPP")l arises out of a commercial lease for office space in
downtown Boise executed by Boise Mode as landlord and Donahoe Pace as tenant and
personally guaranteed by Appellant Timothy Pace. At some point during its tenancy, Donahoe
Pace raised concerns about inconveniences caused by construction in the building and, of its own
initiative, stopped paying rent in full. Boise Mode apologized for any inconvenience caused and,
as a gesture of goodwill, granted Donahoe Pace a one-time rent abatement.
Several months after the construction had completed, and despite numerous attempts by
Boise Mode to negotiate a resolution to the unpaid rent, Donahoe Pace vacated the office space
six months prior to the termination ofthe lease and ceased paying rent altogether. After
additional demands for repayment to both Donahoe Pace and Timothy Pace were unsuccessful,
Boise Mode sued Donahoe Pace for unpaid rent and Timothy Pace for breach of his guarantee.
Donahoe Pace counterclaimed, alleging that it had been constructively evicted from the office
space, even though it remained there long after the construction had ceased. When Boise Mode

Boise Mode uses the term "DPP" where appropriate for the convenience of the Court because
Appellants used that term. As discussed further infra in the main text, however, Appellants'
wholesale use of "DPP" is inconsistent with the record and erroneously implies that the
Appellant Donahoe Pace and Appellant Timothy Pace are similarly situated in this case. For
example, only Donahoe Pace -- not Timothy Pace -- entered into the commercial lease at issue
here, and only Donahoe Pace filed a counterclaim. R 14, 84.
1

- 143355.0011.4791502.1

moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP chose to seek a continuance
pursuant to I.R.c.P. 56(f) rather than oppose the motion on the merits. The district court
ultimately granted Boise Mode's motions for summary judgment on its claims and on Donahoe
Pace's counterclaims. DPP now appeals.

B.

Prior Proceedings
Boise Mode concurs for the most part with DPP's description ofthe prior proceedings in

this case. The following additional information and clarifications are, however, necessary for an
accurate understanding of those proceedings.
Although both Donahoe Pace and Timothy Pace filed the Answer to Boise Mode's
Complaint, only Donahoe Pace -- not Timothy Pace -- filed the Counterclaim. R 80, 84. In that
Answer, DPP alleged several affirmative defenses but did not allege as an affirmative defense
that Boise Mode had breached the lease agreement between the parties. R 80-90.
On March 23,2010, Boise Mode and DPP jointly filed a Stipulation for Scheduling and
Planning wherein the parties jointly requested trial dates in December 2010, or January 2011. R
103-106. Pursuant to that Stipulation, the district court entered an Order setting trial for
December 8, 2010 and, among other things, establishing a deadline of 60 days prior to trial for
hearings on all motions, including motions for summary judgment. R 107-111. On July 29,
2010, Boise Mode and DPP filed a stipulation to vacate and reschedule the trial date from
December 8, 2010 to February 23,2011 on grounds that both counsel had scheduling conflicts
with the original trial date. R 132-133. On August 10,2010, the district court entered an Order
granting the stipulation and vacating and rescheduling the trial as requested by the parties. R
140-143. By moving the trial date, the district court also moved the deadline for hearings on all
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motions, including motions for summary judgment, to December 25,2010 (60 days before the
rescheduled trial date of February 23,2011). R 140-143.
Between May 10, 2010, the date on which Boise Mode served its Answers and Responses
to DPP's discovery requests, and the filing ofDPP's Rule 56(f) Motion on December 8, 2010,
counsel for DPP raised no concerns or issues with Boise Mode's Answers and Responses. R
471.
On November 24,2010, Boise Mode timely filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting papers, and, in compliance with the district court's revised Scheduling Order, noticed
the hearing for 28 days later, December 22,2010. R 152-154, 181-186. 2 In support, Boise
Mode argued that, as a threshold matter, Donahoe Pace lacked standing to pursue its
counterclaims because it had not complied with the requirements of Idaho Code § 6-320. Boise
Mode also argued, in the alternative, that even if Donahoe Pace had standing, summary judgment
in Boise Mode's favor was proper on the merits. R 168-178.
Rather than oppose Boise Mode's Motion for Summary Judgment on the merits, DPP
chose to merely file a Rule 56(f) Motion for a continuance. R 363.
On December 27,2010, the district court entered an Order granting Boise Mode's Motion
for Summary Judgment ("Summary Judgment Order"). R 451-460. In that Summary Judgment
Order, the district court found, among other things, that Boise Mode met its burden of proving
the existence of the Lease and the Guarantee and the fact of the breaches of each by,

2 Boise Mode actually filed two motions for summary judgment, one on its claims and one on
Donahoe Pace's counterclaims. R 152-154, 184-186. For simplicity, Boise Mode refers to both
motions, collectively, as the "Motion for Summary Judgment."

-343355.0011.4791502.1

respectively, Donahoe Pace and Timothy Pace. R 454. The district court also concluded that
because Donahoe Pace had not complied with the notice requirement ofldaho Code § 6-320(d),
it lacked standing to bring its counterclaim for constructive eviction and, because the other
counterclaims were premised upon the claim for constructive eviction, the court granted
summary judgment on all counterclaims based upon the lack of standing. R 458. 3
On January 5,2011, the district court entered a judgment in favor of Boise Mode on its
claims against Donahoe Pace and Timothy Pace, awarding it damages in the amount of
$95,975.96, plus post-judgment interest, and ordered Donahoe Pace's counterclaims dismissed
("First Judgment"). R. 461-462.
On January 19, 2011, fourteen days after the entry of the First Judgment, DPP filed its
self-styled Motion to Amend Judgment Pursuant 10 I.R.C.P. 59(e) ("Motion to Amend"). R 481.
On March 2,2011, the district court issued an order granting the Motion to Amend
("Order Granting Motion to Amend"). In that order, the district court reversed its ruling that
Donahoe Pace's counterclaims fell under the purview ofldaho Code § 6-320. Because the
Summary Judgment Order "was predicated on the Court's finding that I.e. § 6-320 applied to the
Defendants' constructive eviction and breach claims," the court reversed the Summary Judgment
Order and voided its First Judgment. R 517-524.

3 The district court also granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment as to Donahoe
Pace's counterclaims for tortious interference with contract and negligent supervision. R 456457. Donahoe Pace did not move the district court to reconsider that portion of its Summary
Judgment Order, nor has it raised that issue to this Court.
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On April 27, 2011, Boise Mode filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Further
Reconsideration in which it sought a ruling on the substantive arguments it had made in support
of its motion for summary judgment. R 581-583,560-579.
On May 17, 2011, Boise Mode filed supplemental answers to DPP's discovery requests,
wherein Boise Mode identified the one other tenant in the same building as Donahoe Pace who
had lodged complaints about "noise, disturbance, disruption, or interference of any type" and
explained the nature of those complaints and how they were resolved. Boise Mode also made
clear that there was no agreement between itself and The North Face specifying that Boise Mode
would be penalized if improvements were not completed by a specified date. R 615-618.
On June 22, 2011, the district court entered an Order in which it addressed, for the first
time, Boise Mode's substantive arguments, and, finding them to have merit, granted Boise
Mode's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration. R 642-646.
On August 17, 2011, the district court entered an Order awarding Boise Mode costs as a
matter of right in the amount of$219.00 and attorney fees in the amount of$25,875 pursuant to
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and 54(d)(1)(C). R 679-684.
On August 26, 2011, the district court entered a Judgment awarding Boise Mode
damages against Donahoe Pace and Timothy Pace, jointly and severally, in the amount of
$95,975.96, and it awarded requested attorneys' fees and costs against Donahoe Pace and
Timothy Pace, jointly and severally, and dismissed, with prejudice, Donahoe Pace's
counterclaims. R 686-687 ("Second Judgment").
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C.

Counterstatement of Facts
Boise Mode cannot concur in DPP's Statement of Facts and, instead, offers the following

counterstatement of facts.
1.

The Relevant Contracts.
a)

The Lease.

On or about November 3, 2006, Boise Mode and Donahoe Pace (not DPP) entered into
an Office Lease Agreement ("Lease") for the premises located at 800 Idaho Street, Suite 350,
Boise, Idaho ("Premises"), together with lower level storage space in the same building (the
building at 800 Idaho Street will be referred to hereinafter as the "Facility"). R 14-45.
Among other things, the Lease contains the following provisions:
•

Landlord reserves the right to affect such other tenancies in the
Facility as Landlord, in its sole discretion, deems appropriate; and
Tenant does not rely on Landlord's leasing to any specific tenant, or to
any number of tenants, any space in the Facility. (R 22, Article 2.1.)
(Bold emphasis added.)

•

BASE RENT. Tenant shall pay to Landlord as monthly Base Rent for
the Premises the amount specified in Article 1.11, which amount shall
be paid in advance on the first day of each calendar month from March
1, 2007 and thereafter throughout the term of the Lease; .... Except as
specifically provided hereiu, there shall be no deduction, offset or
abatement for any reason of the rent or any money payable by
Tenant to Landlord. (R 24, Article 4.1.) (Bold emphasis added.)

•

QUIET ENJOYMENT. Landlord agrees that Tenant, upon paying
the reut and other monetary sums due under this Lease and
performing the covenants and conditions of this Lease and upon
recognizing purchaser as Landlord, may quietly have, hold and enjoy
the Premises during the term hereof; subject, however, to loss by
casualty and all restrictions and covenants contained or referred
to in this Lease. (R 41, Article 19.3.) (Bold emphases added.)
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•

DEFAULT. The occurrence of any of the following shall constitute a
material default and breach of this Lease by Tenant:
(a) Any failure of the Tenant to pay the Base Rent, additional
rent, or any other monetary sums required to be paid
hereunder. Iftenant fails to cure said default within five (5) days
after written notice by Landlord to Tenant, Landlord shall be
entitled to exercise its rights and remedies as provided in Article
20.3 herein, without further notice to Tenant.
(b) The abandonment of the Premises by Tenant without
Tenant continuing to pay Base Rent in a timely manner. (R 41,
Article 20.1.) (Bold emphases added.)

•

REMEDIES. In the event of any such material default or breach by
Tenant, Landlord may at any time thereafter without limiting Landlord
in the exercise of any right or remedy at law or in equity which
Landlord may have by reason of such default or breach:
(a) Maintain this Lease in full force and effect and recover the rent
and other monetary charges as they become due, irrespective of
whether Tenant shall have abandoned the Premises. (R 42, Article
20.3.)

The term of the Lease was from December 1, 2006 through May 31, 2010. R 21, Article
1.9.

b)

The Personal Guarantee.

On or about November 3, 2006, in connection with the Lease, Timothy Pace
executed a Personal Guarantee of Lease ("Personal Guarantee") whereby he personally
guaranteed all obligations owed Boise Mode by Donahoe Pace arising under or relating to the
Lease. R 64-65. Among other things, the Personal Guarantee provides:
1. GUARANTEE: The Undersigned jointly, severally, personally,
and individually guarantee(s) payment when due, or upon demand
after the due date, all obligations and the full amount of money that
Tenant now or in the future owes Landlord arising under or
relating to the Lease ... plus interest, attorney fees, costs, penalties
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and expenses of collection incurred because of Tenant default,
including post-judgment collection costs ("Liabilities"). The
Liabilities shall not be reduced by any claim of setoff or
counterclaim of Tenant or Undersigned, loss of contribution from
any of the Undersigned, or any settlement or compromise between
Tenant and Landlord.
2. PAYMENT: If Tenant shall fail to pay all or any part of the
Liabilities when due, whether by acceleration or otherwise, the
Undersigned, immediately upon written demand by the Landlord,
will pay to the Landlord the full amount of the Liabilities as if the
Liabilities constituted the direct and primary obligation of each of
the Undersigned.

5. LEGAL ACTION AND ATTORNEY FEES: Landlord may
proceed against one of the Undersigned before or after proceeding
against any tenant, any co-guarantor, or other party, or any
security.
R 64-65.

2.

Donahoe Pace Fails to Pay Rent and Boise Mode Makes a Demand.

At some point -- the record is unclear when -- Donahoe Pace voiced some concerns about
inconveniences related to construction in the Facility. Despite the provision in Article 4.1 of the
Lease, Donahoe Pace then failed and refused to make the required rent, operating costs and
charges due and owing to Boise Mode under the terms of the Lease beginning as early as
October -- and no later than December -- 2008. R 301.
On May 13,2009, Angela Aeschliman, the Director of Property Management for Boise
Mode's property manager, Watermark Property Management ("Watermark"), sent a written
demand to Donahoe Pace and to Timothy Pace, as guarantor, noting that despite a previous
notice of delinquency for delinquent rent payments from December 2008 through May 2009,
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Donahoe Pace had failed to make the required rent payments. The letter made demand for
payment of delinquent rent payments totaling $22,958.80 for the months December 2008 through
May 2009. R 292.

3.

Boise Mode Grants Donahoe Pace an Abatement for Goodwill.

Also on May 13,2009, Ms. Aeschliman sent an additional letter to Donahoe Pace to
"clear up misunderstandings." In that letter, Ms. Aeschliman explained that Boise Mode had
previously granted Defendant a one-time $1,000 rent abatement "[f]or "goodwill" in connection
with the inconveniences caused by the construction in the Facility even though, pursuant to the
terms of the Lease, Boise Mode was within its rights to improve the building without offset of
Donahoe Pace's rent. R 294.

4.

Boise Mode Responds Promptly to Complaint from Timothy Pace.

On May 21,2009, at 8:19 P.M., Timothy Pace sent an e-mail to Ms. Aeschliman and
"Sid" at Mountain Top Maintenance, thanking Sid "for all your time this week on the elevator
front, as well as the new elevator keys." Mr. Pace also informed Ms. Aeschliman and Sid that
the elevator in the Facility was not working and requested that they address the problem as soon
as possible. One half-hour later, at 8:49 P.M., Ms. Aeschliman responded, "Tim we will get
someone out asap. Thanks for informing us." At 7:37 A.M. the next morning, Ms. Aeschliman
sent an e-mail to Tim Pace informing him that "The elevator is working at this time" and
requesting that he let her know ifhe experienced additional problems. R 297-298.

5.

Construction Completes Prior to June, 2009.

On June 3, 2009, Ms. Aeschliman sent another letter to Donahoe Pace, informing it,
among other things, that "the construction has ended and has been complete now for almost 2

- 943355.0011.4791502.1

months." The letter further directed Donahoe Pace to immediately report any issues with "noise,
the elevator, the hallways, et cetera." The letter concluded by again demanding payment of the
outstanding rent due by June 5, 2009. R 300.
6.

Donahoe Pace Seeks to Extend the Term of the Lease.

On June 8, 2009, Timothy Pace sent an e-mail to David Baum stating that "we think now
may be a time to consider rewriting the balance of our lease and extending into the end of next
year. Is that an option you might consider?" R 259 (emphasis added).
7.

Boise Mode Attempts to Reach a Resolution and Continues to Demand
Payment of Back Rent.

On July 30,2009, after a number of communications between himself and Timothy Pace
regarding Mr. Pace's concerns about past inconveniences related to construction, David Baum
offered a potential resolution. Mr. Baum explained that a number of the improvements Boise
Mode had made to the building would result in increased energy efficiency and lower energy
costs for Donahoe Pace. Mr. Baum offered to Donahoe Pace a rent reduction from August
through June as well as an agreement to purchase consulting work each month from Donahoe
Pace. In return, he asked only that all past due balances be paid by August 3rd • R 285.
On August 13,2009, Boise Mode, by and through its counsel, sent a written demand to
Donahoe Pace and to Timothy Pace, as guarantor, for payment by August 24, 2009, ofthe
delinquent rent and charges owed by Defendant under the terms of the Lease, which sums totaled
$19,967.99 as of that date. R 314-316.
On August 14,2009, Timothy Pace made a counter-proposal to David Baum, seeking a
10% rent reduction for August through June "as an acceptable resolution for the past limitations
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placed on our ability to conduct business due to construction problems," as well as other
concessions. R 280 (emphasis added).
On October 5,2009, Boise Mode, by and through its counsel, sent a letter entitled
THREE (3) DAYS' NOTICE TO PAY RENT AND/OR TO QUIT AND VACATE THE
PREMISES (Three Days' Notice) to Donahoe Pace and Timothy Pace notifying both that
Donahoe Pace was in default under the terms of the Lease and demanding, pursuant to Idaho
Code § 6-303(2), payment ofthe past due amount of $29,242.49 to Boise Mode within three
days of service of the notice. R 331-333.
On October 8, 2009, Boise Mode, by and through its counsel, made another attempt to
reach a resolution by sending an e-mail to Timothy Pace referencing the Three Days' Notice and
offering, as a compromise and settlement, a $13,000 credit against the $22,017.99 outstanding
rent in exchange for entering into an amendment to the Lease. R 335.
On October 26,2009, after receiving a counteroffer from Timothy Pace, Boise Mode, by
and through its counsel, sent a letter to Donahoe Pace and to Timothy Pace, as guarantor,
advising that Boise Mode has considered and rejected the counteroffer. The letter specified that
Boise Mode's offer would remain open until October 30,2009. The letter also reminded
Donahoe Pace that, should it vacate the premises on November 1, 2009, it "will remain obligated
to make timely payments of the rent through the duration of the term of the Lease." R 339-340.

8.

Donahoe Pace Vacates and Fails to Pay Any Additional Rent.

Donahoe Pace vacated the Premises on or around November 3, 2009. On November 9,
2009, Boise Mode, by and through its counsel, sent a letter to Defendant confirming that
Defendant had abandoned the Premises and notifying Defendant that pursuant to Article 20.3 of
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the Lease, the Lease remained in effect and Defendant remained obligated to pay all rent and
other charges due under the Lease until Boise Mode re-leased the Premises. R 67-68.
After vacating, neither Donahoe Pace nor Timothy Pace made any further payments to
Boise Mode and, as a result, owed Boise Mode $95,975.96 for unpaid rent, other fees and costs,
and interest as of November 23,2010. R 188-194.

II.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Boise Mode notes that the following issues are not contested by DPP: (1) DPP does not
contend that it breached the Lease by failing to fully pay rent beginning in December, 2008, nor
does it contest the amount of rent it owes Boise Mode; (2) DPP does not dispute that it vacated
the Premises on or about November 3, 2009 or that it failed to pay any rent after that point in
time even though the term of the Lease extended through May, 2010; (3) DPP does not dispute
that Boise Mode attempted to mitigate its damages by locating a new tenant for the Premises;
and (4) DPP does not contest the dismissal of its counterclaims for tortious interference with
contract and for negligent supervision.
Boise Mode also clarifies that DPP's arguments on appeal relate solely to alleged
inconveniences caused by construction in the Facility and that DPP does not dispute that the
construction ceased prior to June, 2009.

III.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Boise Mode seeks its attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41 and
Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121.
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IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
1.

Motion to Continue Pursuant to Rule 56(f).

This Court reviews a denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for an abuse of discretion and thus
analyzes "ifthe trial court knew it had the discretion, acted within the parameters provided to it
and demonstrated an exercise of reason." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238,
108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005) (quoting Brady v. City of Homedale, 130 Idaho 569, 572, 944 P.2d
704, 707 (1997)).

2.

Consideration of Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration.

This Court likewise reviews a grant of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908,914 (2001) ("The decision to
grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial
court.").

3.

Summary Judgment Standard.

This Court's standard of review of a summary judgment ruling is the same standard the
district court was required to apply in deciding Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment.
See Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 249, 108 P.3d 392,396 (2005). Under

that standard, Boise Mode bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to some element of its claims. Id. at 250, 108 P.3d at 397. If Boise Mode
succeeds, "the burden shifts to [DPP] to show that a genuine issue of material fact on the
challenged element ofthe claim does exist." Id. To satisfy that ultimate burden, DPP "may not
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rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting LR.C.P. 56(e)). A "mere scintilla of
evidence" that creates only "slight doubt as to the facts" is not enough to avoid summary
judgment. NW Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 839, 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002).
As for Donahoe Pace's counterclaims, "Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 239, 108 P.3d at
386.

B.

The District Court Correctly Denied DPP's Rule 56(f) Motion.
Rather than oppose Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment on its merits, DPP

chose to merely file a motion for continuance under Rule 56(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court correctly denied that motion.
Rule 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion
that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or make such other order as is just.
LR.C.P. 56(f).
This Court has explained the nature of the burden that a party moving under Rule 56(f)
must meet:
It has been noted that a party who invokes the protection of Rule
56(f) must 'do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why
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he cannot respond to a movant's affidavits ... and how
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by
discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the
absence of a genuine issue of fact.' Allen v.
BridgestonelFirestone, Inc., 81 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1996).
Further, in order to grant a motion for additional discovery before
hearing a motion on summary judgment, the plaintiff has the
burden of setting out "what further discovery would reveal that is
essential to justify their opposition," making clear "what
information is sought and how it would preclude summary
judgment." Nicholas v. Wallenstein, 266 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th
Cir. 2001).
Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 239, 108 P.3d at 386. In other words, a party seeking relief under Rule

56(f) "must articulate what additional discovery is necessary and how it is relevant to
responding to the pending motion." Id. (emphases added).
In Jenkins, the plaintiffs' attorney filed an affidavit in support of the Rille 56(f) motion
stating that additional written discovery and depositions were pending and that he "believed the
discovery would provide additional documents and testimony supporting the [plaintiffs']
theories, and that he required the opportunity to use the responses and testimony in additional
discovery in order to thoroughly respond to summary judgment." Id. at 238, 108 P.3d at 385.
This Court upheld the district court's denial of the Rule 56(f) motion because although the
plaintiffs' attorney's affidavit stated that "additional written discovery and depositions were
pending ... he did not specify what discovery was needed to respond to [defendant's] motion
and did not set forth how the evidence he expected to gather through further discovery would be
relevant to preclude summary judgment." Id. at 239, 108 P.3d at 386. The Court also noted that
the case had been pending for more than a year. Id. For those reasons, and because the district
court "recognized it had the discretion to deny the motion, articulated the reasons for doing so,
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and exercised reason in making the decision," the Court concluded that there was no abuse of
discretion in the denial of plaintiffs' motion to vacate. Id.
In this case, DPP likewise failed to satisfy its burden to establish what information it

sought and, in particular, how such information would preclude summary judgment. Rather, the
papers filed in support ofDPP's Rule 56(f) motion were as conclusory as the attorney's affidavit
at issue in Jenkins and, like that affidavit, similarly failed to specifically state "what further
discovery would reveal that is essential to justify their opposition"; failed to make clear "what
information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment"; and failed to "set forth
how the evidence he expected to gather through further discovery would be relevant to preclude
summary judgment." 141 Idaho at 239, 108 P.3d at 386.
In particular, the Affidavit of John Browder filed in support ofDPP's Rule 56(f) Motion

merely discusses what information was sought via written discovery requests (which requests
Boise Mode had answered on May 10, 2011, nearly six months earlier) and then asserts that DPP
attempted to obtain information from third parties Colliers and the North Face without
explaining how any information from those third parties would be relevant to preclude summary
judgment. R 364-365, ~~ 4-5. 4
DPP does not even argue to this Court that its submissions in support of its Rule 56(f)
Motion met the burden established by Jenkins. Rather, DPP merely argues that the district court
erred because there were "discovery requests outstanding at the time of Boise Mode's Motion for

Notably, despite receiving Boise Mode's written responses nearly six months earlier, and
despite asserting, in support of its Rule 56(f) Motion, that Boise Mode had "raised a number of

4
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Summary Judgment" and "Boise Mode had sole possession of some of the materials DPP was
seeking." App. Briefat 13. In support of that argument, DPP relies solely on several cases from
outside Idaho. DPP's reliance on those cases is misplaced, because it relies only on those cases
while ignoring the on-point authority from this Court, Jenkins. 5
Indeed, Jenkins belies the central tenet ofDPP's argument, that a court abuses its wide
discretion where it denies a Rule 56(f) motion "when there is an outstanding discovery request
and the information sought is in the control of the opposing party." App. Brief at 14.6 As
described above, the Jenkins court actually held just the opposite, namely that it was not an abuse
of discretion for the district court to deny a Rule 56(f) motion where there were outstanding
discovery requests seeking information that was, presumably, in the control of the opposing
party. 141 Idaho at 238-39, 108 P.3d at 385-86.7

specious objections," counsel for DPP had not once contacted counsel for Boise Mode to voice
any concerns with those answers. R 471.
5 Boise

Mode recognizes, of course, that federal courts' interpretations of those Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that are substantively similar to Idaho's Rules are persuasive. But where this
Court has spoken on the Idaho Rule - and particularly where, as here, this Court has decided a
case under the applicable Idaho Rule, reliance on federal authority alone is unwarranted. See
Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 678, 201 P.3d 647,651 (2009) ("Given the virtual identity
between these rules and their counterparts in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the lack
orcase law in Idaho, it is appropriate for this Court to tum to federal authority to address the
standard of review.") (Emphasis added.)
6 The text ofDPP's brief on this point refers to a "motion for summary judgment" (App. Brief, p.
14, L. 5-7), but given the context in which the language appears, it seems readily apparent that it
is intended to refer to a motion for a continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f).
7 Although the Jenkins decision does not expressly specify whether the information sought by
the plaintiffs was in the control of the opposing party, given the nature of the plaintiffs' main
argument (that the defendant had dual processes and procedures in place to discharge personnel)
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In any event, the foreign authority on which DPP relies is readily distinguishable on
numerous grounds. Moreover, the rule of law announced in those cases actually supports the
district court's decision in this case. For example, in Doe v. Abington Friends School, 480 F.3d
252 (3d Cir. 2007), the primary case relied upon by DPP, the plaintiffs' Rule 56(f) motion
identified six specific areas of inquiry that were relevant to the central issue in the case -whether the defendant qualified for a religious exemption. Moreover, the defendant there had
filed a motion for summary judgment less than two months after the plaintiffs filed their
complaint, and district court granted such motion "before allowing the Does any discovery into
the factual basis for applying the religious exemption." Id. at 254-58. In addition, the rule of
law endorsed by the Doe court undermines, rather than supports, DPP's argument: the court
noted that a party seeking relief under Rule 56(f) must detail "what particular information is
sought; how, if uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not previously
been obtained." Id. at 255, n. 3 (quoting Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 140 (3d
Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). See Ingle ex reI. Estate ofIngle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th
Cir. 1996) ("Rule 56(f) motions maybe denied .. .ifthe 'additional evidence sought for discovery
would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary
judgment."') (quoting Stragv. Bd. Of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943,954 (4 th Cir. 1995)).
This case differs in at least three significant respects from Doe.
First, DPP failed to explain how the information it sought from third parties was relevant,
let alone how it would preclude summary judgment.

it can be fairly inferred that the plaintiffs were seeking information controlled by the defendant.
141 Idaho at 238, 108 P.3d at 385.
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Second, the timing here is completely, and materially, different: rather than seek
summary judgment at the outset of the case, Boise Mode did not move for summary judgment
until the end of the period oftime allotted for doing so (a period of time to which the parties had
stipulated). In contrast to the motion filed in Doe, Boise Mode's motion did not deprive DPP of
its opportunity for discovery.
Third, DPP failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for why the information it sought
had not been previously obtained, despite the nearly six months that had elapsed from DPP's
receipt of Boise Mode's answers to written discovery. Indeed, under the Doe test, the mere fact
that DPP could articulate no good reason as to why the information it sought had not "previously
been obtained," despite ample opportunity, is alone sufficient to uphold the district court's denial
ofDPP's Rule 56(f) motion, which was based upon that specific reason. R 452. 480 F.3d at 255
n.3. See Contractors Association ofEastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d
1260, 1267 (3d Cir. 1991) (evaluation of a Rule 56(f) motion "requires an inquiry into why the
party seeking more time has not previously obtained the information").
Similar factual differences render other cases cited by DPP distinguishable. See, e.g.,
Ingle, 439 F 3d at 194-196 (in excessive force action, plaintiff sought videotape evidence that

was necessary for a "thorough assessment" of officers' self-serving statements, and plaintiff
presented a plausible argument that the evidence she sought may actually exist); Ward v. United
States, 471 F.2d 667,679-70 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff alleged negligence and sought evidence

regarding operational negligence; government's evidence was relevant only to the issue of
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negligence at the planning level, not at the operational negligence; district court erred in
disregarding the distinction between the two). 8
In any event, the district court's decision on DPP's Rule 56(f) motion clearly evidences
that the court acted within the bounds of its wide discretion in denying the motion. Jenkins, 141
Idaho at 239, 108 P.3d at 386. In its Summary Judgment Order, the district court stated, "a Rule
56(f) motion is committed to the discretion ofthe court" before then declaring a reasoned basis
for denying the motion -- namely, DPP's inability to articulate a reason for seeking discovery of
information that it could have attempted to discover much earlier. Tr 6, p. 21, L. 1-11; R 452, L.
6-12. In other words, the court "recognized it had the discretion to deny the motion, articulated
the reasons for doing so and exercised reason in making the decision." Jenkins, 141 Idaho at
239, 108 P.3d at 386. There was no abuse ofdiscretion. 9

C.

The District Court Correctly Considered and Ruled on Boise Mode's Motion for
Reconsideration and Further Consideration.

8 As

for XRT, Inc. v. Krellenstein, 448 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1971), that per curiam opinion is a
mere four paragraphs long and is, as a result, necessarily bereft of much detail or analysis.
Nevertheless, the terse description of the facts reveals that the documents sought in that case,
work papers from an audit claimed to be false, was directly relevant to the underlying claim, for
fraud in the sale of a business, and to the motion for summary judgment, unlike the information
sought by DPP here.
9 DPP's contention that "considerations of prejudice and delay of proceedings were irrelevant,"
is belied by the record and, in particular, by DPP's own admissions. When questioned by the
district court at the hearing on Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment, counsel for DPP
admitted that a grant of the Rule 56(f) Motion would necessarily result in changes to the
scheduling order. Tr 3, p. 11, L. 23 - p. 12, L. 6. And DPP's contention that the deadline for
opposing motions for summary judgment was almost two months away when it served its
subpoenas is plainly wrong. The latest date for hearing motions for summary judgment was
December 25,2010, so the deadline for filing response briefs was, at the latest, December 11,
2010.
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DPP argues that the district court erred in considering and ruling upon Boise Mode's
Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration. In support, DPP asserts that, because it
styled its Motion to Amend as a Rule 59( e) motion, the district court was precluded from
reconsideration of its Order Granting the Motion to Amend and from further consideration of the
arguments Boise Mode presented in support of its motion for summary judgment. DPP's
argument is contrary to the law and illogical, for three reasons.
First, although DPP's argument is predicated on the text of Rule 11(a)(2)(B), its reading
of that text does not withstand scrutiny. The first sentence of that Rule applies to interlocutory
orders, and it provides that a party may move the court to reconsider "any interlocutory
orders[.]" (Emphasis added.) It is beyond dispute that the district court's March Order granting
DPP's Motion to Amend was an interlocutory order. The second sentence of Rule 11(a)(2)(B),
which DPP relies upon in support of its argument, plainly applies only to orders "made after
entry 0 f final j udgment[.]" The purpose 0 f that sentence's prohibition on reconsideration 0 f
certain orders made after entry of final judgment is to provide a degree of finality. That purpose
is not applicable where, as here, the order entered by the district court pursuant to DPP's selfstyled Motion to Amend had the effect of reinstating the case rather than ending it.
Second, even ifDPP's interpretation of Rule 11 (a) (2)(B) is correct, the district court
properly considered DPP's Motion to Amend as both a motion to amend the First Judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) and as a motion for reconsideration and further consideration of its
Summary Judgment Order pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(B). Although DPP calls such a decision
"inexplicabl[e]," it fails to articulate how or why the court erred in making that determination.
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In any event, the district court correctly understood the dual nature ofDPP's Motion to
Amend. It is undisputed that the Motion to Amend sought a reconsideration of the interlocutory
Summary Judgment Order, not merely an amendment or alteration ofthe First Judgment, and the
court's understanding was consistent with the relief sought by DPP: in its Motion to Amend,
DPP stated that it "respectfully contends herein that the Court committed legal errors in granting
the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment." R 484. The district court thus correctly looked to
the substance ofDPP's Motion to Amend and correctly determined that DPP sought
reconsideration of the court's interlocutory Summary Judgment Order. See Ade v. Batten, 126
Idaho 114, 116,878 P.2d 813,815 (Ct. App. 1994) ("Substance controls in determining whether
a post-judgment motion is a Rule 59(e) or a Rule 60 motion.") (quoting Marane, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 755 F.2d 106, 111, n. 3 (7th Cir. 1985)). Indeed, without a reconsideration

ofthe Summary Judgment Order, there would have been no basis on which to alter or amend the
First Judgment. Accordingly, Rule 11(a)(2)(B) was the proper vehicle for reconsideration of that
interlocutory order. See Shelton v. Shelton, 148 Idaho 560, 564 nA, 225 P.2d 693, 697 (2009)
(noting that a motion for reconsideration under Rule 11(a)(2)(B) "applies to orders made before
and after the entry of a final judgment, not to the final judgment itself'); PHH Mortg. Servs.
Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) ("Because the order granting

summary judgment was filed before the final judgment, it was an interlocutory order.")
The dual nature of the relief sought by DPP in its Motion is further demonstrated by the
district court's Order Granting the Motion to Amend, in which the court granted two separate
requests: it reversed the interlocutory Summary Judgment Order (which the district court had
entered December 27,2010) and it vacated the First Judgment (which it had entered on January
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5,2011). It was the first ruling, the reversal of the interlocutory Summary Judgment Order, that
Boise Mode moved the court to reconsider. R 563.
Third, DPP's argument does not square with the procedural posture of the case or with
logic. In its Motion for Reconsideration and/or Further Consideration, Boise Mode moved the
district court to address the issues that the court had not yet addressed in its prior rulings.
Indeed, Boise Mode stated, in that motion, that it was "not requesting that this Court revisit the
legal issues upon which it has already ruled; rather, it requests that this Court rule on the
arguments that Boise Mode raised earlier but which the Court has not yet addressed." R 563.
When Boise Mode initially moved for summary judgment, it argued both that Donahoe
Pace lacked standing and, in the alternative, that Boise Mode was entitled to summary judgment
because, as a matter of law, Donahoe Pace was precluded from asserting a claim for constructive
eviction and was not entitled to withhold rent. R 166-178. The district court's Summary
Judgment Order addressed only the threshold standing arguments, as did the court's Order
Granting Motion to Amend. As a result, at the time Boise Mode filed its Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Further Consideration, the district court had neither considered nor ruled
upon Boise Mode's alternative substantive arguments.
Indeed, in granting DPP's Motion for Reconsideration, the district court noted that its
initial grant of Boise Mode's Motion for Summary Judgment "was predicated on the Court's
finding that I.e. § 6-320 applied to the Defendants' constructive eviction and breach claims." R
523, L. 13-15. In other words, the district court had addressed only the threshold issue (the
application of Section 6-320), and therefore never considered or ruled upon the other arguments
pressed by Boise Mode in support of its motion for summary judgment. In particular, the district
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court had not considered or ruled on Boise Mode's arguments: (1) that Donahoe Pace was
precluded from asserting a claim for constructive eviction as a matter oflaw; and (2) that,
irrespective of whether Boise Mode breached the Lease as contended, Donahoe Pace was not
entitled to withhold rent, as a matter of contract and as a matter of law. It was these substantive
arguments on which Boise Mode sought a ruling in the Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Further Consideration. The district court properly recognized that those issues remained
outstanding and properly considered them upon motion by Boise Mode.
The application ofthe result DPP urges to the facts ofthis case illustrate its absurdity.
DPP argues, in essence, that the district court was precluded from ruling on the substantive
issues raised in Boise Mode's Motion for Summary Judgment because the court initially granted
summary judgment based upon a threshold issue. For this reason, even ifDPP's interpretation of
Rule 11(a)(2)(B) was otherwise convincing -- and it is not -- this demonstrates that DPP's
reading of Rule 11(a)(2)(B) is illogical and would lead to the absurd result that, simply by
characterizing a motion for reconsideration as a Rule 59(e) motion, a party could avoid any
further consideration by the district court of issues raised in a summary judgment motion, even
where, as here, the initial judgment was entered based solely upon a threshold issue -- standing.
In short, DPP's argument is illogical and impractical and would lead to an absurd result.
The district court did not err, let alone abuse its discretion, in considering and ruling upon a
motion from Boise Mode that sought consideration of issues that the court had not previously
addressed.
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D.

The District Court Properly Entered Summary Judgment for Boise Mode on
Donahoe Pace's Counterclaims.

Donahoe Pace asserts that the district court abused its discretion in granting Boise
Mode's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims. Donahoe Pace's argument in
support is misplaced because it ignores both the Lease and the law.
Donahoe Pace asserted three counterclaims, for: (1) constructive eviction; (2) breach of
contract; and (3) breach ofthe covenant of good faith and fair dealing. For two independent
reasons, the district court correctly dismissed these counterclaims.
1.

Donahoe Pace Cannot Maintain a Counterclaim for Constructive Eviction as
a Matter of Law Because it was Behind on its Rent and Because it Waited
Until Long After the Construction had Ceased to Abandon the Premises.

First, Donahoe Pace's counterclaim for constructive eviction fails as a matter oflaw
because a tenant cannot maintain an action for constructive eviction if the tenant has not kept
current on rent payments. See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P. 2d 368,374
(Utah 1996) ("To establish a constructive eviction, however, the lessee had to vacate the entire
lease-hold, and only then could the lessee withhold rent.") (Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that Donahoe Pace was behind rent at the time it vacated the premises in

November 2009. In fact, Donahoe Pace owed Boise Mode more than $30,000 in back rent and
other charges as of November 9,2009. R 335. Boise Mode had notified Donahoe Pace multiple
times that it was substantially in arrears on its rent payments. E.g., R 292,294,300,314-316,
331-333. Defendant cannot, therefore, maintain an action for constructive eviction.
For similar reasons, Defendant's counterclaims for breach of contract and breach ofthe
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, both of which are premised upon an alleged breach of
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the covenant of quiet enjoyment and are therefore tied to the defective counterclaim for
constructive eviction, also fail as a matter oflaw. See 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant

§ 492 (2006) ("The payment of all required rent is a condition precedent to the maintenance of
an action for breach of the covenant [of quiet enjoyment]."). Notably, this legal principle is
consistent with the Lease, which expressly conditions the right of quiet enjoyment upon payment
of "rent and other monetary sums due under this Lease and performing the covenants and
conditions of this Lease." R 41.
Moreover, a tenant cannot sue for constructive eviction ifit waits to abandon the leased
premises until after a problem ceases. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 517 (2006)
("However much the tenant may be disturbed in the beneficial enjoyment of the premises by the
landlord's wrongful act, there is no constructive eviction if the tenant continues in possession of
the premises."); id. at § 518 ("The tenant loses the right to abandon the premises if, before
carrying out the intention to abandon, the cause for abandonment ceases to exist.").
Here, Defendant based its constructive eviction claim upon the construction activity
occurring in the Facility. It is undisputed, however, that the construction ceased more than 5
months before Donahoe Pace vacated the Premises. R 300. For this additional reason, Donahoe
Pace's constructive eviction claim is precluded as a matter oflaw.
Indeed, the entire basis of the counterclaim for constructive eviction -- that Donahoe Pace
"was forced to vacate the Premises and obtain alternate suitable space in which to conduct its
business" -- is belied by the evidence. Rather than being "forced to vacate" in November, 2009,
because the space was unsuitable, Donahoe Pace actually sought to extend the term of its Lease
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at least as recently as June 8, 2009, and was actively negotiating rent concessions up through late
October, 2009. R 259. 10
In short, Donahoe Pace was not "forced to vacate." It chose to leave rather than pay its
contractual obligations under the Lease, despite substantial financial concessions offered by
Boise Mode. It was only when Donahoe Pace's attempts to extract additional concessions from
Boise Mode were rejected -- long after construction had ceased -- that it vacated the Premises.

2.

Donahoe Pace's Counterclaims Based Upon an Alleged Breach of Contract
Fail Because Donahoe Pace Failed to Demonstrate an Essential Element of
Those Claims.

Second, even if Donahoe Pace's counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing were not tied to its counterclaim for constructive
eviction, they cannot survive summary judgment because Donahoe Pace failed, both at the
district court level and on appeal, to demonstrate how any breach by Boise Mode caused it any
damage.
It is well-settled that "a failure of proof on an essential element of the opposing party's

case makes all other facts immaterial." Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126 (1988).
Likewise, it is beyond cavil that an essential element of a claim for a breach of contract is a
showing of damages. For these reasons, even ifthe inconveniences related to construction
actually constituted a breach by Boise Mode, Donahoe Pace's counterclaims fail as a matter of
law because it has not pointed in the record to any damages.

Notably, Donahoe Pace's suggestion to extend the lease came after construction had ceased.
R 259,300.
10
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"It is a fundamental premise of contract law that, although a plaintiff may have been

legally wronged, the plaintiff cannot recover damages unless he was economically injured." Fin.

Fed. Credit Inc. v. Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc. (In re Walter B. Scott & Sons, Inc.), 436 B.R.
582,594 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2010) (quoting Hancock v. Idaho Falls Sch. Dist. No. 91,2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 28755, 2006 WL 1207629 at *4 (D. Idaho May 2, 2006). See Bergkamp v. Martin,
114 Idaho 650, 653, 759 P.2d 941, 944 (et. App. 1988) (plaintifflegally wronged by breach of
cont~act

may not recover damages unless economically injured by the breach).

Donahoe Pace's counterclaim for breach of contract seeks only damages, not injunctive
relief or specific performance. R 86-87. Donahoe Pace does not, however, even specify what, if
any, economic damages it allegedly suffered as a result ofthe alleged breach, let alone point to
any evidence in the record of such damage. This failure dooms that counterclaim. Bergkamp,
114 Idaho at 653, 759 P.2d at 944 ("If he wishes to protect some noneconomic interest in a
contract, then he may pursue another remedy such as injunctive relief or specific performance. In
this case, however, the tenants have sought only damages.") As a result, Boise Mode is entitled
to summary judgment on Donahoe Pace's counterclaim for breach of contract. Fin. Fed. Credit

Inc .• 436 B.R. at 594 (granting summary judgment on Debtor's counterclaim for breach of
contract because "Debtor has not produced evidence that may be considered on summary
judgment to show it has been damaged"); Hancock, 2006 WL 1207629 at *4 (granting summary
judgment to Defendant on plaintiff s breach of contract claim because plaintiff "does not claim,
and apparently cannot establish, any economic damages for his breach of contract claims").
Because Donahoe Pace's counterclaim for breach of contract cannot survive summary
judgment, neither can its counterclaim for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
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dealing, which also seeks only damages. See First Security Bank of Idaho v. Gage,
115 Idaho 172, 176, 765 P.2d 683, 687 (1988) (a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing must be based upon an underlying breach of contract). Here, because there is no
valid claim for breach of contract by Boise Mode, there is likewise no breach ofthe covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
In short, each of Donahoe Pace's counterclaims was correctly dismissed by the district
court. Based upon the undisputed facts, none is viable as a matter oflaw.

E.

The District Court Properly Entered Summary Judgment for Boise Mode on its
Affirmative Claims.
DPP argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Boise

Mode on its affirmative claims because "material questions of fact existed as to whether Boise
Mode's breaches excused DPP's non-payment of rent." App. Brief at 22. DPP is wrong. The
undisputed facts establish that DPP and Timothy Pace breached, respectively, the Lease and the
Personal Guarantee, and that, as a matter oflaw, DPP was not entitled to withhold rent.
The material facts related to Boise Mode's claims against DPP and Timothy Pace are
undisputed. In particular, it is undisputed that DPP failed to pay rent and other charges totaling
$95,975.96. Indeed, DPP has conceded that it withheld rent. R 588, L. 2; App. Brief at 23. It is
undisputed that DPP withheld rent payments beginning no later than December, 2008, and that it
ceased paying rent altogether no later than November, 2009, even though the Lease extended
through the end of May, 2010. DPP's decision to withhold rent was directly contrary to its
obligations under the Lease, and nothing in the Lease or in Idaho law gave DPP any right to
withhold rent.
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1.

Boise Mode Established the Existence of the Lease and Personal Guarantee
and the Fact of Breaches of Each by Donahoe Pace and Timothy Pace,
Respectively.

"The burden of proving the existence of a contract and fact of its breach is upon the
plaintiff, and once those facts are established, the defendant has the burden of pleading and
proving affirmative defenses, which legally excuse performance." Idaho Power Co. v.

Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 746-47, 9 P.3d 1204, 1212-13 (2000).
It is undisputed that Boise Mode and Donahoe Pace executed the Lease and that Donahoe

Pace breached the Lease when it failed to timely pay the rent due in full beginning no later than
December, 2008, when it abandoned the premises in November, 2009, and when it subsequently
failed to pay any rent through the remaining term of the Lease. It is also undisputed that Boise
Mode neither terminated the Lease nor released Donahoe Pace of its continuing obligation to pay
rent under the terms of the Lease.
It is undisputed that Timothy Pace executed the Guarantee, pursuant to which he

personally guaranteed all of Donahoe Pace's obligations under the Lease, including all monies
owed to Boise Mode. It is undisputed that Timothy Pace has failed to pay to Boise Mode the
monies owed by Donahoe Pace.
Neither Donahoe Pace nor Timothy Pace can prove any affirmative defense that legally
excuses their respective duties of performance under the Lease and the Guarantee. In fact,
neither even pled the defense that they argue here -- that their respective breaches were excused
by a prior breach by Boise Mode. R 81-84. As a result, the district court properly entered
summary judgment on Boise Mode's breach of contract claim.
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Under Idaho law, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be
based upon an underlying breach of contract. Gage, 115 Idaho at 176, 765 P.2d at 687.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant
implied by law in a party's contract. ... The covenant requires the
parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their
agreement, and a violation of the covenant occurs when either
party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the
contract.

Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703,52 P.3d 848,855-56 (2002) (citation omitted).
It is undisputed that Donahoe Pace breached the express terms of the Lease by its failure

to timely pay the full amount of rent due and by its abandonment of the premises and failure to
continue to pay rent to Boise Mode. By reason of these breaches, Donahoe Pace has deprived
Boise Mode ofthe rights and benefits that arise under the specific terms of the Lease. As a
result, for the same reasons that the district court's grant of summary judgment on Boise Mode's
claim for breach of contract was correct, so too was its ruling on the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. See id.

2.

DPP's Argument About Boise Mode's Alleged Prior Breach is a Red
Herring.

Although DPP acknowledges that it failed to pay the rent due under the Lease and fails to
point to any affirmative defense actually pled that could excuse such payment, DPP nonetheless
argues that there are material questions of fact as to whether Boise Mode's alleged breaches
"excused DPP's non-payment of rent." App. Brief at 22. But even assuming, solely for the sake
of argument, that Boise Mode breached the terms of the Lease, and that any such breach was
material, it still would not have excused DPP's payment of rent, as a matter of contract and as a
matter oflaw. Put simply, the material question is simply whether DPP was entitled to withhold
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rent based upon Boise Mode's alleged breach. That is a question oflaw. Moreover, it is clear as
a matter of law that DPP was not entitled to withhold rent.
In other words, the relevant question for purposes of Boise Mode's claims is whether

there exists any genuine issue of material fact about whether DPP was entitled to withhold rent.
The undisputed facts in this case establish that the answer to this question is clearly "no," under
both the terms ofthe Lease and Idaho law.

a)

DPP's Argument is Foreclosed by the Unambiguous Terms of the
Lease, Which Provide that DPP was not Entitled to Withhold Rent
Payments.

As a matter of contract, DPP was not entitled to withhold rent. In fact, the Lease clearly
and unambiguously provides that DPP could not withhold rent. In particular, Article 4.1
provides:
Except as specifically provided herein,11 there shall be no
deduction, offset or abatement for any reason of the rent or any
money payable by Tenant to Landlord.

R42.
DPP does not contend -- nor could it -- that Article 4.1 is unclear or ambiguous. As a
result, the application of the Lease, and of Article 4.1, in particular, to these facts is, as the
district court properly recognized, a question of law. "When a contract is clear and
unambiguous, the interpretation of that contract is a question of law to be decided by the trial
court." Empire Lumber Co. v. Thermal-Dynamic Towers, Inc. 132 Idaho 295, 303, 971 P.2d
1119, 1127 (1998).

11 DPP does not contend -- and there is no basis for doing so -- that any of the specific Lease
provisions referred to in Article 4.1 apply here.
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As with other contracts, "in deciding the rights of parties under a lease, a court is required
to give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent ofthe parties." 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord

and Tenant § 39 (2006).
The unambiguously expressed intent of the parties here, as evidenced by Article 4.1 of
the Lease, is that Donahoe Pace could not deduct, offset, or abate the rent due to Boise Mode
under the Lease except as specifically provided therein. DPP does not argue that any specific
provision in the Lease excuses DPP's nonpayment of rent, and it could not, because there is no
such provision. Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the Lease, therefore, DPP was not
entitled to withhold rent. See American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 402, 94
P.3d 699, 707 (2004) ("the offset provision is unambiguous. When there is no ambiguity, there is
no occasion for construction and coverage must be determined using the plain meaning of the
words employed."); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 49 (2006) ("In instances where the
terms of a lease are unambiguous, they must be enforced as written, and no court can rewrite a
lease to provide a better bargain to suit one of the parties.").
As a result, Boise Mode is entitled to summary judgment on its claims against DPP for
failure to pay rent and other monies due under the Lease. There is no question of material fact as
to whether DPP withheld rent payments, and the Lease must be enforced as written.

b)

DPP's Argument is Foreclosed by Idaho Law, Which Permits a
Tenant to Withhold Rent Only in Very Limited Circumstances, None
of Which Apply Here.

Although the clear terms of the Lease are alone sufficient to reject DPP's argument
regarding Boise Mode's claims, those terms are also consistent with Idaho law. A tenant is
entitled to withhold rent upon a breach by the landlord only in very limited circumstances. As a
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result, even if Article 4.1 of the Lease was not clear or did not otherwise settle the matter in
Boise Mode's favor, Idaho law would.
The only provision in Idaho law enabling a tenant to withhold rent is a single subsection
ofIdaho Code § 6-320, which specifies that a tenant may deduct from its rent monies spent on a
smoke detector.

I.e. § 6-320(a)(6) ("If the landlord or the landlord's assignee fails to install

working smoke detectors, the tenant may send written notice by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the landlord or the landlord's assignee that if working smoke detectors are not
installed within seventy-two (72) hours of receipt of the letter, the tenant may install smoke
detectors and deduct the cost from the tenant's next month's rent.") (Emphasis added.) Of
course, that provision has no application here.
Although it could be argued that a breach ofthe implied warranty of habitability would
justify the withholding of rent, there is no allegation of such a breach in this case. Authority
from other jurisdictions indicates that a tenant may withhold rent if the landlord breaches the
implied warranty of habitability. See, e.g., 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 613 (2006)
(noting that some jurisdictions "recognize that the landlord warrants that there are no conditions
that materially affect the health and safety of tenants" and in such jurisdictions, "where
conditions exist that adversely affect the health or safety of tenants ... abatement of rent is
appropriate"). Whether that is the law in Idaho is unclear, but it is immaterial because it is
undisputed that Boise Mode did not violate Idaho's implied warranty of habitability.
Indeed, the basis ofDPP's argument in support of its Motion to Amend was that it was
not required to provide notice under Idaho Code § 6-320 because Boise Mode did not breach the
implied warranty of habitability. R 485-487. The district court agreed with that argument. As
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the court noted in its March Order, Idaho Code § 6-320 is Idaho's statutory version ofthe
implied warranty of habitability. Even if a landlord's violations of subsections 1-5 ofIdaho
Code § 6-320(a) did permit a tenant to withhold rent, DPP has argued, and the district court
ultimately agreed, that the alleged breaches by Boise Mode in this case are not the kind of
breaches that implicate Idaho Code § 6-320. As a result, there was no basis under Idaho law for
Donahoe Pace to withhold rent.
This conclusion is consistent with the generally-recognized rule oflaw that, "[i]n the
absence of an eviction, actual or constructive, or a complete destruction of the leasehold, a tenant
is bound to discharge the covenant to pay rent unless the tenant is released therefrom by the
happening of some event which by the covenants of the lease terminates it." 49 Am. Jur. 2d

Landlord and Tenant § 593 (2006) (emphasis added). Here, no lease covenant released Donahoe
Pace from its obligation to pay rent; in fact, as discussed above, Article 4.1 of the Lease provides
just the opposite.
DPP's argument about an alleged breach by Boise Mode thus misses the point, and is,
ultimately, a red herring whereby DPP seeks to shift the focus from its conduct in breaching the
Lease by failing to pay rent to Boise Mode's alleged breach ofthe Lease. IfDPP argued that
Boise Mode had breached the Lease by failing to install a smoke detector, its argument would
have some merit. Its argument might also have some traction ifDPP were asserting some other
breach ofIdaho Code § 6-320. However, that is not DPP's argument; in fact,just the opposite.
Consequently, the breach alleged by DPP has no impact on DPP's obligation to pay rent, both as
a matter of contract and as a matter oflaw.
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For all of these reasons, DPP's argument is misguided. Because it is undisputed that
Boise Mode did not violate Idaho Code § 6-320, the issue is not whether Boise Mode was in
breach but rather whether DPP was entitled to withhold rent. Under the clear terms of the Lease,
as well as Idaho law, DPP had no such right. As a result, the district court correctly concluded
that there is no triable issue of fact regarding the merits of Boise Mode's claims against Donahoe
Pace, and the court property entered summary judgment for Boise Mode for breach of contract
and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

3.

The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment to Boise Mode on
its Claim for Breach of Personal Guaranty Against Timothy Pace.

The terms of Defendant Timothy Pace's Personal Guarantee expressly provide that the
liabilities owed under the Personal Guarantee "shall not be reduced by any claim of setoff or
counterclaim of Tenant or Undersigned." It is undisputed that DPP withheld rent from Boise
Mode, that the monies owed Boise Mode by DPP are liabilities that Timothy Pace guaranteed,
and that, despite his Personal Guarantee and demands made upon him by Boise Mode, Timothy
Pace has not paid DPP's debts to Boise Mode. Timothy Pace's guarantee obligates him to make
good on DPP's obligations to Boise Mode. As a result, Boise Mode is likewise entitled to
summary judgment on its claim against Timothy Pace for breach of guarantee.
Where a contract for guaranty is at issue, the rights of the parties are determined strictly
from the terms oftheir agreement. "[W]here the language in the guaranty agreement is
unequivocal, the agreement must be interpreted as a matter of law according to the language
employed therein." Valley Bank v. Larson, 104 Idaho 772, 775-776, 663 P.2d 653,656-657
(1983) (quoting McGill v. Idaho Bank & Trust, 102 Idaho 494, 498, 632 P .2d 683, 687 (1981 )).
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"Plain and unambiguous tenus dictate the intent of the parties and the obligations guaranteed."
CIT Financial Servs. v. Herb's Indoor RV Ctr., Inc., 118 Idaho 185, 187, 795 P.2d 890, 892
(et. App. 1990). For this reason, as with other contracts, the intent of the parties to a guaranty
must be gleaned from the unambiguous language of the guaranty, without recourse to extrinsic
evidence of the parties' intent. Valley Bank, 104 Idaho at 775,663 P.2d at 656; Johnson Equip.

v. Nielson, 108 Idaho 867, 871, 702 P.2d 905, 909 (et. App. 1985).
There is no dispute that Donahoe Pace owes Boise Mode money "arising under or
relating to the Lease," nor that Donahoe Pace has failed to pay such sums. There is no dispute
that the plain and unambiguous tenus of the Personal Guarantee provide that Timothy Pace is
liable for such debt. As a result, the district court properly entered summary judgment for Boise
Mode on its claim against Timothy Pace.

4.

Donahoe Pace's Counterclaims Cannot Prevent Summary Judgment
Entering in Boise Mode's Favor on its Claims.

Donahoe Pace's counterclaims cannot prevent summary judgment in Boise Mode's favor
on its claims, for two reasons. First, as discussed above, those counterclaims lack merit. Second,
pursuant to the express tenus of both the Lease and the Personal Guarantee, neither Donahoe
Pace nor Timothy Pace has the right to offset the amount owed to Boise Mode. The Lease
provides, in Article 4.1, that "[ e]xcept as specifically provided herein, there shall be no
deduction, offset or abatement for any reason of the rent or any money payable by Tenant to
Landlord." R 42. The tenus of the Personal Guarantee likewise provide that "[t]he Liabilities
shall not be reduced by any claim of setoff or counterclaim of Tenant or Undersigned." R 64-65.

- 37 43355.0011.4791502.1

DPP relies upon cases addressing general contract principles that establish that a material
breach by one party to a contract excuses performance by the other. But DPP missteps in its
application of those general contract principles to the specific contract at issue herein, the Lease.
Even if a landlord's breach was material, it would not permit the tenant to remain in the premises
and withhold rent. DPP essentially argues that a breach by a landlord allows a tenant to "have
his cake and eat it too," by occupying the leased premises rent-free. That is not the law. Rather,
as set forth above, Idaho law clearly establishes only one situation in which a tenant may
continue to occupy the demised premises and withhold any rent, and that situation is indisputably
inapplicable here. See I.C. § 6-320(a)(6).

F.

Boise Mode is Entitled to An Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal.
Boise Mode is entitled to an award of Attorney Fees on Appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121; I.AR. 40; I.A.R. 41; and pursuant to the terms ofthe Lease and the
Personal Guarantee.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies on appeal just as it applies in the district court. Erickson
v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 438, 64 P.3d 959,967 (Ct. App. 2003) The district court correctly
awarded Boise Mode attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) because it was undisputed that
Boise Mode filed suit to recover for breach of a commercial contract. Id., 138 Idaho at 436, 64
P.3d at 965. Accordingly, section 12-120(3) entitles Boise Mode to attorney fees on appeal.
See, e.g., Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-29, 152 P.3d 594,599-600

(2007).
Boise Mode is also entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the Lease
and the Personal Guarantee. R 46, Article 22.7; R 64-65.
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In addition, Boise Mode is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 12-121. A court may award attorney fees under I.e. § 12-121 "when it finds, from the facts
presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation." I.R.C.P.54(e)(1). "An award of attorney fees is appropriate if the law is
well-settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing that the district court
misapplied the law." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148 (1999)
(internal citations omitted). Boise Mode is entitled to attorney fees because, as set forth above,
the law in this case is well-settled, and DPP has made no showing that the district court
misapplied the law.
V.
CONCLUSION

For each ofthe foregoing reasons, Boise Mode respectfully submits that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying DPP's Rule 56(f) motion, it properly considered Boise
Mode's Motion for Reconsideration and Further Consideration, and it correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of Boise Mode on its claims and on Donahoe Pace's counterclaims. Boise
Mode requests that this Court affirm the district court's Second Judgment in all respects and,
further, award Boise Mode its attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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